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Notes
A Reasonable Alternative to the Reasonable
Alternative Design Requirement in Products
Liability Law: A Look at Pennsylvania
Andrew Meade*
The manner in which design defects should be defined has caused more controversy than any
other area of products liability law. The Restatement (Third) defines a product design as
defective when the foreseeable risks of harm from using a product could have been avoided if
the manufacturer had used a reasonable alternative design. This definition departs from the
Restatement (Second), which defines defective products as unreasonably dangerous if the
product fails to meet the expectations of consumers. Without so stating, the Restatement (Third)
essentially changes products liability law from a regime of strict liability to one of negligence.
The debate is most unsettled in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court currently
follows the approach of the Restatement (Second), holding that negligence has no place in
determining whether a product is defective and, instead, modeling liability based on consumer
expectations. In 2007, however, the Third Circuit predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would adopt the Restatement (Third) and apply a fault-based standard to determine
liability in products liability cases. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case
to decide whether it should apply the Restatement (Third); however, in 2009, it dismissed the
appeal as improvidently granted. As a result, the products liability law in Pennsylvania is in flux.
I argue that instead of following either of the Restatements, courts should apply strict liability, in
which manufacturers are liable for foreseeable harm caused by their products, regardless of
whether the product was deemed “defective.” Although defect will not serve as a limitation on
liability, manufacturers will be protected under my proposal by the affirmative defenses of
negligent use or assumption of risk. By eliminating the elusive concept of defect from products
liability, liability will be more predictable and will better reflect the costs of product use.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011; M.S. Pace
University, 2006; B.A., Lewis & Clark College, 2004. Thank you, Professor John Diamond, for your
help and inspiration throughout this endeavor. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal
editors for their hard work in editing this piece and Volume 62 Editor-in-Chief, Sara B. Tosdal, for her
devotion to the Hastings Law Journal. Finally, I would like to congratulate and thank the 2010 world
champion San Francisco Giants for a wonderful season.
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Introduction
The manner in which design defects should be defined has
generated more discussion and caused more controversy than any other
1
area of products liability law. Defining design defects was the most

1. David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 927, 927 (2009).
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explosive issue surrounding the drafting and adoption of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (“Restatement
2
(Third)”). Now, more than ten years after its publication in 1998, neither
3
courts nor scholars agree on the proper definition for design defects.
Rather, the controversy seems to have increased, as disagreement exists
over the extent to which the Restatement (Third) has been adopted by
the states, whether it should be adopted, and the scope of liability
4
imposed once it has been adopted.
The controversy surrounding the Restatement (Third) centers on
5
section 2, which defines defective product design. The Restatement
(Third) defines a product design as defective when the foreseeable risks
of harm from using a product could have been minimized or “avoided” if
6
the manufacturer had used “a reasonable alternative design.” This
definition departs from the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Products
Liability (“Restatement (Second)”), which defines defective products as
unreasonably dangerous if the product fails to meet the expectations of
consumers, and this failure is in turn unreasonably dangerous to the
7
consumer. The Restatement (Second) imposes liability even if the seller
8
exercises all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product. In
contrast, under the reasonable alternative design requirement of the
Restatement (Third), liability hinges on the conduct of the
9
manufacturer. Although the Restatement (Third) does not use either
term, it essentially alters the products liability regime from a standard of
10
strict liability to one of negligence.
The debate has taken on a partisan tone. Opponents to the
Restatement (Third) argue that the shift is anti-consumer and the
11
product of a “distinctive pro-defense bias.” Proponents, on the other
hand, argue that the Restatement (Second) bases liability “on the jury’s

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Compare Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1061, 1106–08 & n.203
(2009) (cataloguing states’ acceptance of the Restatement (Third) and opining that it has struck a
balance between “sound litigation theory and actual litigation practice” and “will stand the test of
time”), with Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective Product Design: The Quest For a WellOrdered Regime, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1039, 1059 (2009) (“Restatement (Third) missed the mark for
normative rules in a well-ordered design defect regime. Intended or not, it has been seen as rolling
back decades of progress and returning to an era of defendant protectionism.”).
5. See Owen, supra note 1, at 930.
6. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998).
7. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g (1965).
8. Id. § 402A.
9. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998).
10. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1067; see also Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably
Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72 Tenn. L. Rev. 833, 833–34 (2005).
11. Phillips, supra note 10, at 834.
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whim.” At present, the debate is most unsettled in Pennsylvania. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court currently follows the approach of the
Restatement (Second), holding that negligence has no place in
determining whether a product is defective and, instead, modeling
13
liability based on consumer expectations. After the publication of the
Restatement (Third), several justices on the court questioned the utility
of strict liability for design defects, but did not adopt the Restatement
14
(Third). In 2007, however, in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc.,
the Third Circuit predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, if
confronted with the issue, would adopt the Restatement (Third) and
apply a fault-based standard to determine liability in products liability
15
cases.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bugosh v.
I.U. North America, Inc., to decide “[w]hether [it] should apply section 2
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in place of section 402A of the
16
Restatement (Second) of Torts.” However, in the summer of 2009, over
a two-justice dissent, the court dismissed the appeal as having been
17
improvidently granted.
As a result, the products liability law in Pennsylvania is in flux. State
courts are bound by the decision in Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., and
must adhere to the Restatement (Second). Federal courts, on the other
hand, when applying Pennsylvania law, follow the Third Circuit decision
set forth in Berrier, which applies the Restatement (Third). Thus,
Pennsylvania provides a stark example of the controversy in defining
18
design defects that is raging across the country. Moreover, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court is likely to settle this difference soon. This
situation provides an opportunity to clarify the law by taking a clear side
on the heated debate surrounding design defects.
I will argue that the Berrier decision and the adoption of the
Restatement (Third)’s fault-based liability was misguided. Rather than
advocating an affirmation of the Restatement (Second) as set forth in
Azzarello, however, I will argue instead that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, when confronted with the opportunity, should apply a form of
strict liability, in which manufacturers are liable for foreseeable harm
caused by their products regardless of whether the product was deemed

12. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1067.
13. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026–27 (Pa. 1978).
14. Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Pa. 2003). In the concurrence, Justice Saylor
emphasizes that the Restatement (Third) has not yet been adopted in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1012
(Saylor, J., concurring).
15. 563 F.3d 38, 60 (3d Cir. 2009).
16. 942 A.2d 897, 897 (Pa. 2008) (per curiam).
17. Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 971 A.2d 1228, 1229 (Pa. 2009) (per curiam).
18. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1067 (describing conflicting definitions of design
defect).
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“defective.” Although defect will not serve as a limitation on liability,
manufacturers will be adequately protected under my proposal by
affirmative defenses such as the plaintiff’s negligent use or assumption of
risk.
Following this introduction, Part I of this Note outlines the origins
and history of products liability law, as well as the rationales behind the
Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third). Part II analyzes and
critiques the relevant Pennsylvania case law, specifically the Azzarello
decision, the Third Circuit’s decision in Berrier, and ultimately, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss in Bugosh. Part III
advocates for a strict products liability regime, in which product
defectiveness is irrelevant. Finally, this Note concludes with a
recommendation to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which is also
relevant to other state supreme courts and legislatures across the
country.

I. Origins of Products Liability Law
A. The Restatement (Second)
The modern concept of strict products liability was first formally
19
introduced in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., in 1963 by
20
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court. In Greenman, the
court held that a “manufacturer is strictly liable . . . when an article he
places on the market . . . proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
21
human being.” Strict liability was justified in order to “insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the
22
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”
Following the rationale in Greenman, section 402A of the
Restatement (Second), published in 1965, imposes liability on anyone
“who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer” even if “the seller has exercised all possible
23
care in the preparation and sale of his product.” The comments to
section 402A define defective products as those that leave the seller’s
hands in an unreasonably dangerous condition not contemplated by the
24
ordinary consumer.

19. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
20. Dominick Vetri, Order Out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 1373, 1381 (2009).
21. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900.
22. Id. at 901.
23. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
24. Id. § 402A cmt. g.
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Section 402A was adopted throughout the United States. Indeed,
“[n]o single doctrinal common law principle was ever adopted so widely
26
and quickly in the United States as strict products liability.” However,
although purportedly embracing strict liability, courts struggled to define
27
what exactly made a product defective, thereby triggering strict liability.
The difficulty was especially apparent in defining defective product
designs, and courts used different tests to determine whether a product
28
was defective.
1. Consumer Expectations Test
Initially, after states adopted the Restatement (Second), the
consumer expectations test became the dominant test utilized by the
29
courts. Relying on the comments to section 402A, courts generally held
that a product was defective if it “perform[ed] less safely than an
30
ordinary consumer would expect.” Generally, courts imposed liability
based on objective consumer expectations rather than using a subjective
31
standard; however, some courts examined the subjective expectations of
32
the actual consumer. Whether employing an objective or subjective
standard of the consumer expectations test, products were deemed
33
defective regardless of the conduct of manufacturers.
The consumer expectations test proved to be ineffective in many
situations. Specifically, the test failed to protect consumers from products
with open and obvious dangers, because consumers could not have any
34
reasonable expectation of safety. Therefore, sellers of unreasonably
dangerous products would escape liability even though the danger of the
35
product could be reduced or eliminated through an alternative design.
In addition to open and obvious dangers, the courts encountered
problems identifying whose expectations should apply in cases where the
25. John L. Diamond, Eliminating the “Defect” in Design Strict Products Liability Theory,
34 Hastings L.J. 529, 533–34 (1983).
26. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1374.
27. Diamond, supra note 25, at 529.
28. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1387–408.
29. Id. at 1386.
30. Id. at 1387.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837, 843 (Miss. 1971); Garrett v.
Nissen Corp., 498 P.2d 1359, 1363 (N.M. 1972); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 242 S.E.2d 671, 680
(S.C. 1978).
33. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 535.
34. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1387.
35. For example, an industrial punch press that omitted a safety guard would likely be considered
an open and obvious danger. Id. at 1388. Therefore under the consumer expectations test, the omission
would not amount to a defective design even though a safety guard would substantially reduce or
eliminate the danger at a slight cost. Id. Vetri notes that some states employed the consumer
expectations test normatively—rather than factually—and inquired into what level of safety ordinary
consumers should expect from a product design. Id. A normative approach necessarily considers
reasonableness of the design. Id.
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consumer controls the safety of other persons such as children, patients,
36
employees, or bystanders. In certain cases, users and bystanders have a
conflict of interest pertaining to the safety of a product. For example,
some individuals buy sport-utility vehicles, because they believe them to
37
be safer due to their weight, size, and height. However, the higher
bumpers on sport-utility vehicles present a vehicle-penetration risk to
38
occupants of other cars in collisions. To address bystander injuries,
some courts expanded the notion of consumer to include bystanders, or
changed the perspective from what an ordinary consumer expects to
39
what an ordinary consumer should expect in terms of safety.
Finally, both courts and commentators complained that consumer
expectations were too vague, especially in cases involving complex
40
products. In cases involving allegedly defective product designs,
“consumers do not [always] have clear expectations as to how a product
41
will perform when subjected to a broad range of uses.” Additionally,
because consumer expectations may vary, a manufacturer could
potentially be subjected to liability no matter how the product is
42
designed.
2. The Risk-Utility Test
Frustrated in part by the potential shortcomings of the consumer
expectations test, some courts undertook a risk-utility analysis to
43
determine product defectiveness. Under a risk-utility test, courts
balanced the danger of the product, measured by the gravity and
likelihood of harm caused by the product, with the utility of the
44
product.
Using a risk-utility balancing test to determine product
defectiveness can take on different forms. An influential article by Dean
John Wade identified a list of factors that could be considered by courts
in determining design defectiveness:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product—its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product—the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Owen, supra note 1, at 942.
Vetri, supra note 20, at 1389.
Id.
See id. at 1390–92.
Owen, supra note 1, at 943.
Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1100.
Id. at 1100–01.
See Owen, supra note 1, at 945.
See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1394.
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the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive
to maintain its utility.
(5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product.
(6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of
the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable
warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the
45
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
46

The Wade factors have been criticized as overbroad. Specifically,
the first factor was politically unpopular because it “allow[ed] courts to
second-guess the market as to the desirability of different kinds of
47
products.” Additionally, the seventh factor—the ability to spread loss—
48
has been criticized because it “always points to liability.” Moreover,
commentators have argued the third factor—the availability of a
substitute product—is a necessary element, rather than a factor, in order
49
to establish a design defect. Without a feasible alternative design,
finding a product defect would necessarily impose liability on the entire
50
product category, something many argue is better left to the legislature.
Concerned about establishing liability over an entire category of
products, some courts required the plaintiff to prove a reasonable
51
alternative design was available in order to establish liability. However,
even these courts differed significantly over what constituted sufficient
52
proof of a reasonable alternative design. Therefore, despite the
criticism, appellate courts often recited the Wade factors in assessing
53
whether a product was defectively designed, and as a result, no uniform
54
test emerged to assess design defectiveness.
In addition to criticisms over what factors should be balanced,
courts differed in framing the scope of the balancing test. Under a
method characterized as “macro-balancing” a court compares a product’s
55
overall total risk with its overall total utility. In contrast, a “microbalancing” approach considers the costs and benefits of adopting a

45. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837–38
(1973).
46. Owen, supra note 1, at 955.
47. Id. at 956.
48. Id. at 958.
49. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1096.
50. Id. at 1069.
51. See Kenneth R. Meyer et al., The Uncertainty Surrounding “Design” in Design Defect Cases,
76 Def. Couns. J. 428, 428 (2009).
52. See id. at 432.
53. Owen, supra note 1, at 928–29.
54. Id. at 955.
55. Id. at 959.
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particular alternative design feature proposed by a plaintiff. For
example, if a plaintiff is injured by a motorized boat propeller and
proposes an alternative design in which the propeller was equipped with
a propeller guard, the inquiry would only consider the balance of costs
and benefits resulting from adding a propeller guard—not the broader
risks of motorized boat propellers, or generally, the risks of motor57
powered boats.
Despite the widespread adoption of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second), courts struggled to apply the standard in design
58
defect cases, and little uniformity existed between the states. Some
courts applied the consumer expectations test; some applied versions of
59
the risk-utility test, and others applied a combination of the two. The
varying interpretations of the Restatement (Second) paved the way for
the Restatement (Third)’s attempt to codify and update thirty years of
60
products liability law.
B. The Restatement (Third)
The Restatement (Third), published in 1998, sought to describe a set
of “well-ordered” rules to guide courts and practitioners in products
61
liability cases. Specifically, the Restatement (Third) divides the concept
of product defect into three separate subcategories: manufacturing
62
defects, failures to warn, and design defects.
1. Manufacturing Defects
Manufacturing defects are defined as a physical departure from a
63
product’s intended design. Manufacturing defects involve a mistake in
the production process and therefore, tend to occur in only a small
64
percentage of units in a product line. Like the Restatement (Second),
the Restatement (Third) imposes liability on sellers of products with
manufacturing defects, even though all possible care is exercised in the
65
preparation and marketing of the product.
The retention of strict liability for manufacturing defects was, for
66
the most part, uncontroversial. Manufacturing defects are generally

56. Id. at 960–61.
57. Id.
58. See Vetri, supra note 20, at 1408.
59. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1072.
60. Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective Product Design: The Quest for a Well-Ordered
Regime, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1039, 1039 (2009).
61. Id.
62. Vetri, supra note 20, at 1406.
63. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998).
64. John G. Culhane, Real and Imagined Effects of Statutes Restricting the Liability of
Nonmanufacturing Sellers of Defective Products, 95 Dick. L. Rev. 287, 309 n.84 (1991).
65. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998).
66. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1062–64; see also Alex J. Grant, New Theories of
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easy to identify, because they differ from the rest of the product line.
Liability is justified either by applying the consumer expectations test,
where consumers expect a product to function like other products, or by
applying the risk-utility test, where there is a clearly feasible alternative
68
product that functions properly.
2. Failure to Warn
Under the Restatement (Third), a product could also be “defective
69
because of inadequate instructions or warnings.” “Failure to warn”
defects are reserved for “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of
70
reasonable instructions, or warnings by the seller or other distributor.”
Unlike manufacturing defects, the Restatement (Third) implements
a negligence, fault-based standard for defect due to failure to warn. A
plaintiff must show both that a warning was necessary and that such a
71
warning was either absent or inadequate. While warnings may be taken
into account in determining liability, the Restatement (Third) expressly
72
states that warnings are not substitutes for a safer design.
3. Design Defects
Design defects, as defined by the Restatement (Third), exist “when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by
the seller . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the
73
product not reasonably safe.”
The Restatement (Third) expressly states, “consumer expectations
do not constitute an independent standard for judging the defectiveness
74
of product designs.” The foreseeable risks and reasonable alternative
design requirements essentially reset the standard of liability for
75
defective product designs from strict liability to negligence. Although
consumer expectations remain relevant when evaluating a potential
design defect using the risk-utility test, the Restatement (Third) is clear
that a plaintiff cannot establish a defective design without showing a
76
reasonable alternative design.
By expressly disregarding the consumer expectations test as a
Cigarette Liability: The Restatement (Third) of Torts and the Viability of a Design Defect Cause of
Action, 3 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 343, 352 (1994).
67. Culhane, supra note 64.
68. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1063–64.
69. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998).
70. Id. § 2 cmt. i.
71. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1055.
72. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 cmt. l (1998).
73. Id. § 2(b).
74. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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sufficient basis for liability, the Restatement (Third) instead advocates
77
using the fault-based risk-utility approach. Manufacturers would not be
liable for products unless the plaintiff proved they were designed
unreasonably—namely they could have been designed with a feasible
78
and safer alternative design. Like Judge Learned Hand’s algebraic
concept stating that negligence exists if the burden of undertaking
79
precautions is less than the probability of expected harm, under a riskutility analysis, a product would be considered defective if the burden of
designing a safer product was less than the magnitude and probability of
80
harm caused by the existing product.
In addition to hinging liability on the manufacturer’s conduct, the
reasonable alternative design requirement also serves to guard against
81
dangerous products being deemed categorically defective. For example,
alcoholic beverages pose significant health risks when consumed in
excess; employing a risk-utility analysis, a court could potentially
82
determine the risks of alcohol outweigh its utility. However, removing
the alcohol, which would undoubtedly make the product safer, is not a
reasonable alternative design, because it would also deprive consumers
83
of the utility derived from alcohol. Therefore, the reasonable
alternative design requirement guards against categorical products
liability, which the Restatement (Third) deems to be better left to the
84
legislature, rather than the courts.
In the comments, the Restatement (Third) preserved the possibility
that in the future, certain categories of products might be sufficiently
dangerous and of such minimal social utility that they would be deemed
85
defective, even if no alternative design was available. Despite
preserving the possibility of categorical liability, the Restatement (Third)
limited the possibility to products that were not “generally available and
86
widely used and consumed” and attempted to make the possibility of
87
categorical products liability as narrow as possible.

77. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1065.
78. Id. at 1069.
79. Negligence = B < P x L, where B = burden; P = costs of adopting precautions against
foreseeable, accidental loss; L = probable magnitude or expected cost of such a loss if it does occur.
United States v. Caroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 160, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
80. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1065.
81. Id. at 1070.
82. Id. at 1069.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2, cmt. e (1998).
86. Id. § 2, cmt. d.
87. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1071.
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C. Response to the Restatement (Third): Current Law in the
States
The Restatement (Third)’s position on manufacturing defects is
88
generally uncontroversial. While the provisions regarding defects for a
89
failure to warn garnered significant commentary and criticism, no issue
within the Restatement (Third) pertaining to products liability has
generated as much controversy as the proposed standard to define design
90
defectiveness.
91
The defense bar generally praised the change. Manufacturers
generally criticized the consumer expectations test, arguing that while
consumers could expect products to be built according to their design,
they were uninformed regarding all the considerations involved in
92
designing a particular product. Additionally, proponents of the
Restatement (Third) argued that the majority of courts were already
93
employing fault-based standards in products liability cases. In contrast,
the plaintiff’s bar raised concerns that the change failed to protect
94
consumers and was enacted to serve the interests of defendants.
Furthermore, critics contend the Restatement (Third) departs from the
standards employed by a majority of states and amounts to a “regression
95
in the law.”
After the enactment of the Restatement (Third), the debate played
out in courtrooms across the country. In Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co., the Connecticut Supreme Court expressly rejected the
Restatement (Third), stating “that the majority of jurisdictions do not
impose upon plaintiffs an absolute requirement to prove a feasible
96
alternative design.” The Connecticut Supreme Court criticized the
Restatement (Third) and concluded that a feasible alternative design
requirement placed an “undue burden on plaintiffs that might preclude
97
otherwise valid claims from jury consideration.”
However, the Potter decision also recognized criticisms of the
consumer expectations test and chose instead to adopt a “modified
formulation of the consumer expectation test,” in which design
defectiveness involving “complex” products would hinge on a risk-utility

88. William M. Brown, Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Exodus From Contraceptive Research and
How to Reverse It, 40 Brandeis L.J. 1, 18 (2001).
89. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1055–57.
90. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1062.
91. See Stewart, supra note 60, at 1040.
92. Id. at 1042.
93. Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements
on Design Defects, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 807, 807 (2009).
94. See Stewart, supra note 60, at 1059.
95. Id. at 1040.
96. 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997).
97. Id. at 1332.
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98

analysis. Connecticut essentially adopted a two-pronged test for
determining design defects, in which liability could be established by
demonstrating that the product failed to meet consumer expectations, or
99
100
that the product failed to meet risk-utility standards. Arizona,
101
102
103
104
105
106
Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto
107
108
109
Rico, Tennessee, and Washington all employ a similar two-pronged
110
approach to determine design defect.
Other states rejected the Restatement (Third) and risk-utility
analysis in its entirety and insisted on applying the consumer
111
112
113
114
115
expectations test. Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and
116
Wisconsin all employ the consumer expectations test as the sole
standard to determine design defect.
Other courts purported to reject the Restatement (Third), while
nevertheless requiring the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative
117
design. In Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the Restatement (Third), but held that risk-utility evidence may
be introduced by either party to show whether a product was defectively
118
Although the Illinois court ostensibly rejected the
designed.
Restatement (Third) requirement of a feasible alternative design, where
a defendant introduced risk-utility evidence, the plaintiff would be
required to prove the existence of a reasonable alternative design, or that
119
the entire product category was defective. Although not technically
120
requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design, Colorado,

98. Id. at 1333–34.
99. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1098.
100. See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881–82 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
101. Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14 P.3d 990, 994 (Alaska 2000).
102. Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457–58 (Cal. 1978).
103. Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
104. Acoba v. Gen. Tire Co., 986 P.2d 288, 304 (Haw. 1999).
105. Knitz v. Minster Mach., Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982).
106. McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 329–30 (Or. 2001).
107. Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1998).
108. Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Tenn. 2001).
109. Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469, 474 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
110. See Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 14 P.3d 990, 994 (Alaska 2000); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc.,
709 P.2d 876, 881–82 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); see also Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1098–1100
& nn. 156–66.
111. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1104.
112. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 934 (Kan. 2000).
113. Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1154 (Md. 2002).
114. Haag v. Bongers, 589 N.W.2d 318, 329 (Neb. 1999).
115. Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1360 (Okla. 1974).
116. Vincer v. Ether Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis. 1975).
117. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1073–74.
118. 901 N.E.2d 329, 347 (Ill. 2008).
119. Id.; see also Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1094–96.
120. Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276, 286 (Colo. 1978).
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Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Nevada also allow
risk-utility evidence to be introduced as a factor to consider in the design
defect analysis, thereby essentially replacing the consumer expectations
test.
125
Lastly, some courts embraced the Restatement (Third).
126
127
128
129
130
Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana,
131
132
133
134
135
136
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana,
137
138
139
140
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia all
require proof of a reasonable alternative design in order to establish
product defect.
Despite the ambitious effort of the Restatement (Third), consensus
has not emerged on the appropriate legal test for design defects. The lack
of uniformity is especially glaring in comparison to the remarkable
(initial) success of the Restatement (Second). In an age of interstate and
international product shipments, greater uniformity in products liability
law is necessary.

II. The Pennsylvania Story
The debate over the appropriate standard to define design defects is
most unsettled in Pennsylvania, because products liability law in
Pennsylvania is in flux. Pennsylvania state courts are bound by the
141
Azzarello decision, which explicitly adopted the Restatement (Second).
However, in Bugosh, the Third Circuit predicted the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would adopt the Restatement (Third), and federal
district courts have followed its holding when applying Pennsylvania

121. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212–13 (Minn. 1982).
122. Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1184 (N.H. 2001).
123. Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 61–62 (N.M. 1995).
124. McCourt v. J.C. Penney Co., 734 P.2d 696, 698 (Nev. 1987).
125. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1080–81.
126. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985).
127. Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
128. Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995).
129. Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994).
130. Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
131. Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169, 181–82 (Iowa 2002).
132. Burke v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 930, 933 (W.D. Ky. 2007); Toyota Motor Corp., v.
Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004).
133. St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1988).
134. Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207 (D. Mass. 2000).
135. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984).
136. Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202–03 (Mont. 1986).
137. Buonanno III v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 717 (R.I. 1999).
138. Bragg v. Hi-Ranger Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 330 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
139. Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993).
140. Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
141. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Pa. 1978).
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142

law. In a separate case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court certified the
question “whether this Court should apply section 2 of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts in place of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
143
Torts,” but the case was dismissed as improvidently granted.
A. The AZZARELLO Decision
Modern Pennsylvania products liability law is based on the
Azzarrello decision. In Azzarello, the plaintiff’s right hand was pinched
144
in a coating machine made and sold by Black Brothers, Inc. Azzarello
sued Black Brothers, “relying solely on the theory of strict liability under
145
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second).” Black Brothers alleged
Azzarello’s employer’s negligence was the sole or contributing cause of
146
Azzarello’s injuries.
The trial court instructed the jury that liability depended on finding
147
the product “unreasonably dangerous.” The jury returned a verdict for
the manufacturer, though not for the employer of the other defendant
148
who appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that whether a
product was unreasonably dangerous was a question of law to be decided
149
by the judge—not the jury. Instead, once a product was deemed
unreasonably dangerous, the jury would then decide whether the
evidence supported the allegations in the complaint—specifically,
150
whether the product failed to meet consumer expectations.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adhered to the Restatement
(Second), but determined it was meant “to provide guidance for the
151
bench and bar, and not to illuminate the issues for laymen.” The court
compared the concept of strict liability with that of negligence, in which
the court may employ the Hand Formula in determining negligence, but
simply instruct jurors to consider actions of the reasonably prudent
152
man. Concluding that “unreasonably dangerous” was an inadequate
standard to guide a jury on the question of defect, the court held, “It is
clear that the term ‘unreasonably dangerous’ has no place in the
153
instructions to a jury as to the question of ‘defect.’” The court stressed
that a manufacturer is the guarantor of product safety and must provide,

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

E.g., Hoffman v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 942 A.2d 897 (Pa. 2008) (per curiam).
Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1022.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
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along with the product, every element necessary to make it safe for its
154
intended use. If a jury determined that the product did not meet
consumer expectations and caused the injury, liability would
155
automatically follow. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
156
granted a new trial to Azzarello’s employer.
The Azzarello decision paralleled other states in adopting the
Restatement (Second); however, unlike most other states that submit the
question of whether a product was unreasonably dangerous to the jury,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the question whether a
157
product was unreasonably dangerous was one of law. The court
indicated that a judge should employ a risk utility analysis and consider
“social policy” to determine whether a product was “unreasonably
158
dangerous.” However the court did not require the plaintiff to show a
reasonable alternative design before considering a product unreasonably
159
dangerous. Once a product was determined unreasonably dangerous by
a judge, the jury would determine whether the product was defective
based on consumer expectations, or whether the product “left the
supplier’s control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its
intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the
160
intended use.”
B. The BERRIER Decision
Thirty years after the Azzarello decision, in Berrier v. Simplicity
Manufacturing, Inc., the Third Circuit predicted Pennsylvania would
abandon the Restatement (Second) and adopt the Restatement (Third)
161
in its stead. In Berrier, parents of a child who had to have her foot
amputated after being backed over by a lawn mower sued Simplicity, the
162
manufacturer of the lawn mower. The Berriers alleged that the
manufacturer was liable on a theory of negligent design, as well as strictly
163
liable on the basis of defective design. Specifically, the Berriers claimed
the product was defectively and negligently designed because it did not
have any “back-over protection, such as a ‘no mow in reverse’ device or
164
roller barriers.”
After the Berriers filed their claim in state court, Simplicity
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1026–27.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1027.
563 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
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165

removed the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.
Applying Pennsylvania law, the district court granted summary judgment
to Simplicity on both of the claims, reasoning that the Berriers could not
recover because, as a bystander, the injured child was not an intended
166
167
user of the lawn mower. The Berriers appealed.
The Third Circuit, hearing the appeal, noted Pennsylvania had yet
to expressly recognize or reject a bystander’s right to recover under
168
products liability law. In the absence of a controlling decision by the
state supreme court, a federal court must predict how the highest court
169
would decide. The Third Circuit proceeded to reverse the district court
and expressly adopted the Restatement (Third), which permits any
person harmed by a defective product to recover, regardless of whether
170
they were the purchaser or the user of the product.
Although its rationale stemmed from predicting the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would protect bystanders, the Third Circuit expanded its
holding to alter all of products liability law. The court concluded that
“central conceptions borrowed from negligence theory are embedded in
strict products liability doctrine,” and that the “character of the product
171
and the conduct of the manufacturer are largely inseparable.”
Curiously, the Third Circuit’s expansive adoption of the
Restatement (Third) was unnecessary to protect bystanders. Indeed, the
172
court based its rationale in part on Miller v. Preitz, a Pennsylvania case
that implied a cause of action for bystanders under section 402A of the
173
Restatement (Second). The Third Circuit relied on a non-majority
opinion in Miller that recommended adopting the Restatement (Second)
in order to eliminate any privity requirement for products liability
174
actions.
Despite having an independent basis within the Restatement
(Second) to extend liability to manufacturers for bystander injuries, the
court predicted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would abandon the
175
Restatement (Second) in its entirety. The Third Circuit cited a threejustice concurrence in Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, which recommended
176
abandoning the Restatement (Second) in favor of the Third.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 56.
221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966).
Berrier, 563 F.3d at 47.
Id. (citing Miller, 221 A.2d at 333).
Id. at 53.
Id. (citing Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1018–22 (Pa. 2003) (Saylor, J.,
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Additionally, the court relied on a dissent in Pennsylvania Department of
177
General Services v. U.S. Mineral Products, in which two justices
questioned whether foreseeability could be completely separated in strict
178
liability cases. Thus, between opinions issued in Phillips and Mineral
Products, the Third Circuit concluded that four of the current
Pennsylvania justices—enough to overturn Azzarello—voiced support
179
for adopting the Restatement (Third).
The court justified the departure from existing Pennsylvania law as
sound policy, stating “the Third Restatement takes a ‘more progressive
view,’ and far more realistic approach to strict liability when ‘bystanders’
are involved,” and recognized “the essential role of risk-utility balancing,
180
a concept derived from negligence doctrine, in design defect litigation.”
Applying the Restatement (Third), which plainly does not
distinguish between users and bystanders, the Third Circuit concluded
the district court erred in granting Simplicity’s motion for summary
judgment, because it “should not have relied on the ‘intended users’
181
doctrine,” which precluded bystander recovery. The court held the
Berriers were entitled to a trial, because they had proposed several
182
Specifically, the Berriers offered
reasonable alternative designs.
evidence that lawn mowers employing “no mow in reverse” technology
183
or roller guards were examples of safer alternative designs. The court
also reversed the district court on the Berrier negligence claim,
concluding that Simplicity owed a duty to the Berriers despite the child
184
being a bystander. Thus, although the court could have utilized the
Restatement (Second) to protect bystanders, it issued a sweeping
decision significantly altering Pennsylvania products liability law.
C. The BUGOSH Certification
In a separate case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court certified the
question “whether this Court should apply Section 2 of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts in place of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
185
Torts.” However, in the summer of 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme
186
Court dismissed the appeal as having been improvidently granted.

concurring)).
177. 898 A.2d 590 (Pa. 2006).
178. Berrier, 563 F.3d at 53.
179. Id. at 57 n.28.
180. Id. at 60 (quoting Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1015–16 (Saylor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
181. Id. at 60–61.
182. Id. at 63–66.
183. Id. at 44.
184. Id. at 68.
185. Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 942 A.2d 897, 897 (Pa. 2008) (per curiam).
186. Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 971 A.2d 1228, 1229 (Pa. 2009) (per curiam).
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In Bugosh, the plaintiff sought to recover on a strict liability claim
187
under 402A of the Restatement (Second) based on asbestos exposure.
After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the asbestos manufacturer
appealed, arguing that the Restatement (Third) replaced the
Restatement (Second), and that the plaintiffs failed to offer a reasonable
188
alternative design.
In a dissenting opinion to the dismissal, Justice Saylor of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, argued the Azzarello decision left
Pennsylvania products liability law “beset by ‘pervasive ambiguities and
inconsistencies’” and did not provide lower courts with guidance on how
189
to treat cases employing reasonableness and foreseeability standards.
The dissent noted the national controversy over defining design
190
defects. Indeed, the appellee’s brief reiterated criticisms that the
Restatement (Third) was an “inappropriate attempt at tort reform
191
orchestrated by members of the business and insurance communities.”
Nevertheless, the dissent argued that a strict, categorical divide between
strict-liability and negligence concepts was impossible “in light of the tort
system’s largely open-ended damages scheme, and the impossibility of
192
designing products incapable of contributing to human injury.”
The dissent criticized Azzarrello as “unduly disrupting product
investment and innovation” and justified the sweeping policy shift in the
absence of legislative action because Azzarello “has taken our
jurisprudence too far from the legitimate home of tort law in the concept
193
of corrective justice.” Therefore, risk-utility balancing, “an approach
derived from negligence theory,” was a rational and necessary limiting
194
principle. Accordingly, “the Court should disavow Azzarrello” and
195
“adopt Sections 1 and 2 of the Third Restatement in its stead.” In the
view of the dissent, availability of a reasonable alternative design was a
necessary component of establishing liability.
Despite the forcefulness of the dissent, it only garnered two votes,
and the majority did not provide a reason for dismissing Bugosh.
Therefore, Azzarrello and the Restatement (Second) remains good law
in Pennsylvania courts. However, federal courts, when applying
Pennsylvania law, have followed the Berrier decision. The split likely will

187. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1231–32 (quoting Brief for Products Liability Counsel, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Appellants at 28, Bugosh, 971 A.2d 1228 (No. 7 WAP 2008), 2008 WL 6011304).
190. Id. at 1231.
191. Id. at 1232 (citing Brief of Appellee Judith R. Bugosh at 24, Bugosh, 971 A.2d 1228 (No. 7
WAP 2008), 2008 WL 6011308).
192. Id. at 1234.
193. Id. at 1239–40.
194. See id. at 1230.
195. Id. at 1244.
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not last long. The fundamental principle of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins was to avoid forum shopping between state and federal courts
196
based on substantive law. The confusion that remains as a result of the
Bugosh dismissal provides an opportunity to clarify the law by taking a
clear side on the heated debate surrounding design defects.

III. Finding the Appropriate Standard: A Proposal for Change
The battle over the appropriate products liability regime is not
197
isolated to Pennsylvania. Products liability law across the entire
country is in need of greater uniformity. The division is telling: Neither
the Restatement (Second) nor Restatement (Third) has successfully
defined defective product designs. A different approach is overdue. This
Part argues that liability for injuries caused by products should not hinge
on the elusive concept of defect. Rather, liability should be established if
any product fails to perform as intended—or the foreseeable use of a
product causes an injury. Although defect would no longer serve as a
limit on liability for injuries caused by products, foreseeable use and
proximate cause will limit unwarranted liability for manufacturers.
Additionally, defendant-manufacturers will be able to rely on a robust
defense of negligent use or assumption of risk to curb liability. Once a
defendant has proven negligent use of a product or assumption of risk by
the plaintiff, the plaintiff may only recover by showing a safer,
reasonable alternative design was available and could have prevented the
injury.
The proposed products liability regime incorporates aspects of the
consumer expectations test, derived from the Restatement (Second), in
determining foreseeable use of a product; but it relies on the
Restatement (Third) and the reasonable alternative design requirement
to establish liability once a defense has been established.
A. The Proposal
My proposed products liability regime can be separated into three
parts:
(1) A plaintiff, injured by a product in the course of its foreseeable
use, establishes a prima facie case for strict products liability.
(2) The defendant can rebut the prima facie case through an
affirmative defense, either by showing that the product was used
negligently, or that the plaintiff assumed the risk for the injuries.
(3) If the defendant meets its burden of showing negligence or
assumption of risk on the part of the plaintiff, liability is precluded unless
the plaintiff can prove that a feasible alternative design could have
196. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
197. See supra notes 112–36 and accompanying text.
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prevented the injury.
This proposed regime of products liability avoids the confusion
and difficulty of defining defective product designs that plagued both of
the Restatements. Instead, it incorporates components of each
Restatement into separate stages of the plaintiff’s burden of production.
The plaintiff’s initial burden relies on the consumer expectations test of
the Restatement (Second). If the manufacturer shifts the burden back
through an applicable defense, the plaintiff must prove a reasonable
alternative design as prescribed by the Restatement (Third).
B. Foreseeability Rather than Defect
Both Restatements impose liability for defectively designed
198
199
However, liability is limited to defective products.
products.
Manufacturers of non-defective products—even if they cause harm—are
200
not liable. This limitation contrasts with traditional strict liability.
Traditional strict liability “is liability in tort, imposed on an actor”
(including a manufacturer of a product) “for the harms the actor causes,
201
regardless of whether or not the actor was negligent.” Therefore,
traditional strict products liability would not hinge on whether the
product was defective, but rather, whether the product caused the injury.
Although product defect is not an essential attribute to a products
liability regime, without any limitations, traditional strict liability would
202
hamper designs and be unduly burdensome on manufacturers.
However, a strict liability regime with specific limitations, like those
outlined in my proposal, presents a more predictable and fairer standard
than a remedial scheme that pivots on the elusive task of defining a
product defect.
Even under a traditional strict products liability regime, liability is
203
204
not unlimited. Rather, liability only follows from foreseeable injuries.
Under my proposal, like traditional strict liability, liability will only
follow from foreseeable use of a product. For example, a lawn mower
manufacturer would be liable for any injuries caused by the product used
while mowing one’s lawn. However, the manufacturer would not be
liable for injuries caused from the unforeseeable use of the lawn
mower—such as where the mower was used in an attempt to break down

198. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A (1965).
199. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A (1965); see also Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1066.
200. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1066.
201. James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 377, 380 (2002).
202. See id. at 397.
203. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 529 n.2.
204. Id.
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fire wood into kindling. Moreover, even if a fact-finder concluded that
using a lawn mower in such a manner was a foreseeable use—or
misuse—of the product, the manufacturer would be shielded from
205
liability based on negligent use of the product, as discussed below.
A plaintiff could show a product was used foreseeably in a variety of
ways. Sometimes foreseeable use will be apparent based on the obvious
206
nature of the product. Like the Restatement (Second), this inquiry
considers objective consumer expectations about how the product is
used. However, the inquiry into whether a product was used foreseeably
does not ignore manufacturer conduct. For example, industry experience
207
and the way the product is portrayed also shape consumer expectations.
In contrast to the Restatement (Second), which analyzed consumer
expectations to determine product defect, under my proposal, consumer
expectations are used to determine whether or not the use of the product
was foreseeable. While consumers may be ill informed about the
intricacies of how a product is designed, they have clear expectations
208
about how a product is used.
It is worth noting, foreseeable uses of a product are distinguishable
209
from foreseeable risks of a product. Negligence liability restrains
liability based on foreseeable risks; however, strict products liability
holds sellers and manufacturers liable regardless of whether they
210
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.
For example, cancer may not have been a foreseeable risk of exposure to
asbestos at the time it was manufactured; however, because cancer may
develop from a foreseeable use of asbestos products, under my proposal,
liability follows.
C. Available Affirmative Defenses: Negligent Use and Assumption
of Risk
My proposed regime would hold manufacturers liable for
unforeseeable injuries caused by their products, so long as the product
was used in a foreseeable way. Therefore, even if a manufacturer
exercises reasonable care in the design of the product, they still may be
exposed to liability. However, this expansion of liability, is limited
through two affirmative defenses: negligent use and assumption of risk.
Under my proposal, extreme misuse of a product would likely be
unforeseeable and therefore would shield the manufacturer from

205. See infra Part III.C.
206. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1053.
207. Id.
208. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74 Brook. L.
Rev. 781, 783 (2009).
209. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1053.
210. Id.
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liability. However, even if the misuse of a product is foreseeable, a
manufacturer could preclude liability by showing that the plaintiff
unreasonably or negligently used the product. Similar to the doctrine of
contributory negligence, recovery for injuries caused by the negligent use
of a product—even if foreseeable—would preclude recovery.
Similarly, the defense of assumption of risk would be available to
defendants. Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, when dangers are
211
apparent, the defendant does not owe a duty to protect the plaintiff.
Therefore, under my proposal, when consumers are injured by products
with open and obvious dangers, a defendant will avoid liability if it can
212
be shown that the plaintiff assumed the risk.
While the defenses of negligent use and assumption of risk in the
products liability context help avoid unwarranted manufacturer liability,
the defenses also introduce the shortcomings of the consumer
expectations test. Specifically, products with open and obvious dangers
invite defenses of negligent use and assumption of risk that would bar a
plaintiff from recovering when safer products were available.
D. Evidence of a Reasonable Alternative Design as an Alternate
Route to Recovery
To avoid these pitfalls, under my proposal, once the affirmative
defenses of negligent use or assumption of risk are proven by the
defendant, the plaintiff can still introduce risk-utility evidence, showing a
feasible alternative design was available, and therefore, that it was
unreasonable to place the product on the market. This concept borrows
directly from the Restatement (Third), in that if plaintiffs can show a
reasonable alternative design was available, they can recover despite
their own negligence or misuse of the product, assuming the reasonable
alternative design would have adequately protected them against their
own negligent use.
Unlike the Restatement (Third), which places the initial burden of
213
proving a reasonable alternative design on the plaintiff, my proposal
only enables the introduction of risk-utility evidence and evidence of a
reasonable alternative design after the defendant has successfully raised
an affirmative defense of negligent use or assumption of risk. In the

211. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707 (Cal. 1992).
212. States have differing standards over the scope of assumption of risk as an affirmative defense.
See Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 Ohio St.
L.J. 503, 506 (1987). Clearly, a lack of uniformity regarding the affirmative defense hinders forming a
uniform products liability regime. For the purposes of this proposal, assumption of risk is considered a
question of fact for the jury and is available as an affirmative defense when “a plaintiff has voluntarily
and intelligently undertaken an activity which he knows to be hazardous in ways which subsequently
cause him injury.” Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107, 1112 (Pa. 1993).
213. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1069.
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context of a strict liability regime, the initial burden is properly placed on
the defendant once the plaintiff shows the product caused the injury.
E. A Note Regarding Bystanders
Like the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third), under
my proposal, injuries to bystanders will not preclude liability to the
product manufacturer. Like a direct injury to the product user, a
bystander can make out a prima facie case for strict products liability by
showing the foreseeable use of the product caused the injury to the
bystander. The affirmative defenses available to defendants will still be
available if the bystander’s own negligence caused her injury, or she
assumed the risk of being a bystander. For example, a fan at a baseball
game, hit by a foul ball, likely assumed the risk associated with attending
the game.
Hypothetically, if a product user’s negligent use of a product injured
a bystander, and the bystander did not assume the risk, the defense
would not be available to preclude the manufacturer’s liability for the
bystander’s injuries. However, the manufacturer would be able to limit
liability through indemnification of the negligent product user.
Under my proposal, in the case of Berrier, the bystander child
injured by the lawn mower could set forth a prima facie case of strict
liability. It is certainly possible the defendant manufacturer could raise
an affirmative defense of assumption of risk pertaining to the child
214
but assuming they are unsuccessful, the defendant
bystander,
manufacturer could also indemnify the user of the lawn mower based on
negligent use of the lawn mower. This would not preclude recovery on
behalf of the bystander, but would serve as a limitation on the
manufacturer’s liability. Of course, if the manufacturer successfully
showed negligent use on the part of the product user, the product user
could still introduce evidence that a reasonable alternative design would
have avoided the injury. In the case of Berrier, even if the manufacturer
showed the lawn mower user was negligent in backing over the child, the
user could still show that back-over protection, or a “no mow in reverse”
device would have avoided the injury all together.
F.

Justifications for the Proposal

Imposing strict liability based on foreseeable use of a product, while
allowing a manufacturer a defense of negligent use or assumption of risk,
avoids the shortcomings of defining product defect that plagued the
Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third). My proposal avoids
the deficiencies of the consumer expectations test, because consumer
214. An assumption of risk defense is available even when a child is injured, so long as they were
aware of the dangers and accepted the risk. Long v. Manzo, 682 A.2d 370, 374 (Pa. Super. 1996).
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expectations about product use are more easily discernable than
consumer expectations about a product’s design. Additionally, products
with open and obvious dangers will not escape liability, because injuries
caused by the foreseeable use of the products—whether the danger is
open and obvious or not—will still trigger liability. Defendants,
especially manufacturers of products with open and obvious dangers, will
rightfully raise a defense, such as negligent use or assumption of risk;
however, plaintiffs injured by unreasonably dangerous products will still
be able to recover by showing that a reasonable alternative design would
have prevented the injury.
My proposal avoids the shortcomings of the Restatement (Third),
because it retains a standard of strict liability, without collapsing the
standard into negligence. Once a prima facie case of liability is
established through an injury caused by the foreseeable use of the
product, the burden is on the defendant to show the plaintiff acted
unreasonably. This conforms to the purpose of strict products liability,
namely that manufacturers “insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from . . . products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products
on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
215
protect themselves.” Despite extending liability without regard for
fault, my proposal protects manufacturers because they are not required
to compensate plaintiffs for injuries resulting from the unforeseeable use
of a product. Moreover the defenses of negligent use and assumption of
risk provide defendants with additional protection from liability.
Expanding liability to all products, regardless of defect, would shift
the true costs of products onto manufacturers rather than onto victims of
216
a product that causes injury. Undoubtedly, manufacturers would shift
217
the increased costs to the consumer in the form of higher prices.
Nevertheless, the higher prices would reflect the total costs of a product
218
that causes injury to the consumer. Consumers would respond to
higher prices by foregoing purchasing products that regularly cause
injuries. For example, any lawn mower that caused injuries would be
more expensive due to the added liability costs. Safer lawn mowers,
however—perhaps with “no mow in reverse” technology—would be
relatively cheaper. Consumers would be driven to the lower priced, safer
products. My proposal’s regime of strict liability for all products reflects
the true costs of the product and thereby encourages the socially
appropriate level of consumption.

215.
216.
217.
218.

Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 531.
Id.
Id.
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G. Criticisms of the Proposal
Some have argued strict products liability has expanded to its peak,
and further expansion of no-fault liability is institutionally impossible for
219
the courts to implement. It is worth noting that strict liability already
applies in a number of significant areas. The worker’s compensation
220
system is based on strict liability. Additionally, traditional strict liability
applies to commercial enterprises engaged in abnormally dangerous
221
222
activities. Employer vicarious liability is also based on strict liability.
Lastly, products with manufacturing defects are essentially subject to
traditional strict liability. Although a product must be deemed defective
before liability without fault is imposed, determining defect is not
difficult, because the product differs from other prototypes on the
market. Liability for manufacturing defects therefore hinges on
causation.
Expanding strict liability to all products has been attacked on three
specific grounds: (1) expanding strict liability creates categorical liability
and will eliminate certain products from the market; (2) expanding strict
liability raises problems in determining causation; and (3) expanding
223
liability creates a moral hazard, as consumers will not avoid injury.
1. Categorical Liability
Expanding liability to products without defect imposes categorical
224
liability on all products. The Restatement (Third) requires proof of a
225
reasonable alternative design specifically to avoid category liability.
The drafters were concerned that under a standard risk-utility test, a factfinder could conclude the risks associated with a product would outweigh
226
the benefits—even if no alternative were available. Critics note this
form of liability has not been embraced by American courts and was
227
explicitly prohibited by the Restatement (Third).
Admittedly, under my proposed strict liability regime, products that
cause injuries result in liability for the manufacturer. All products would
be subject to liability—not just products deemed defective. Because no
product can be made completely safe, nor would it be cost effective to do
so even if possible, manufacturers will undoubtedly face higher liability
costs. The consequences of categorical liability, however, are neither as

219. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1263, 1268 (1991).
220. Henderson, supra note 201, at 383.
221. Id. at 385.
222. Id. at 401.
223. Id. at 391–97.
224. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 219, at 1268.
225. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4, at 1070.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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drastic nor as disastrous as commentary has argued. It is worth noting
that categorical liability does not prohibit the sale or use of a product.
Rather, it would establish liability for the injuries caused by the product.
While the price of dangerous products might increase based on the
injuries they cause, the increase in liability would reflect the true costs of
the product.
2. Causation
The expansion of products liability has been criticized as posing
228
difficult problems of determining causation. In a regime in which
liability does not hinge on defect, whether the product caused the harm is
central to whether a product manufacturer will be liable for injuries
associated with the product.
Professor James Henderson, a reporter for the Restatement (Third),
argued expanding strict liability beyond defective products was
unworkable, because determining whether a product caused an injury
229
would place too heavy a burden on the courts. As an example,
Henderson posed a hypothetical accident in which a plaintiff, after eating
a heavy lunch of pasta and drinking two bottles of beer, climbed upstairs
230
to retrieve a book from his bedroom. On the way downstairs to answer
the door, while glancing at his book, the plaintiff tripped on a roller skate
left by his daughter, fell down the stairs, and crashed through the glass
231
screen of the television. Henderson argued that the hypothetical
implicated too many defendants, and if liability were imposed without
defects, each product mentioned could be liable for the plaintiff’s
232
resulting injury.
Certainly a products liability regime that imposed limitless liability
on the hypothetical defendants would be undesirable. However, under
my proposed strict liability regime, liability is limited to injuries caused
by a product’s foreseeable use. This would eliminate any liability of the
television manufacturer and the roller skate manufacturer, because
neither of those products caused the injury during the course of
foreseeable use. Similarly, the plaintiff would have a difficult time
showing the beer, pasta, and book were proximate causes of the injury.
233
Proximate cause is undoubtedly an elusive concept, but if foreseeability
can limit the duty of care in negligence actions, there is no reason why it
cannot be determined in products liability cases. Finally, any of the
hypothetical defendants could raise an affirmative defense that the
plaintiff acted negligently in using the product, or assumed the risk of
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Henderson & Twerski, supra note 219, at 1268.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1280–81.
Id. at 1281.
See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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using the product. If a fact-finder concluded leaving the roller skate on
the staircase was unreasonable, the manufacturers of the staircase and of
the roller skate would be precluded from liability. In the posed
hypothetical, when analyzed under my proposal, a plaintiff would be
required to show safer, reasonable alternative designs were available—
which is exactly the standard Professor Henderson and the Restatement
234
(Third) advocate.
Complex products liability cases, whether the regime requires a
defect or not, will undoubtedly arise. Like in negligence actions, in a
235
strict liability regime, proving causation rests with the plaintiff. That
said, if multiple products, used in a foreseeable way, cause injury, liability
should ensue for all of the products. The task of determining causation
can be difficult, but this does not justify imposing a defect requirement in
order to establish liability.
3. Moral Hazard
Expanding strict liability has also been attacked as inviting moral
hazard—“the natural tendency for insureds to increase their risks of
incurring covered losses by risky conduct after the insurance takes
236
effect.” The argument contends that expanding strict products liability
invites riskier behavior, because losses are spread to everyone through a
237
higher priced product. This encourages careless use of a product by
those who would use expanded liability as insurance, while risk-averse
consumers will choose not to consume the product, because they are
forced to pay an increased price and would not benefit from the increase
238
in insurance.
As applied to my proposal, this argument suffers from two flaws.
First, limiting liability to foreseeable use of a product greatly diminishes
the ability to use products in injury-prone ways while still imposing
liability on the manufacturer. Additionally, the affirmative defenses of
negligent use and assumption of risk serve as a check on risky behavior
because certain uses of a product will preclude recovery for the plaintiff.
Second, the argument fails to acknowledge the effect that expanded
liability would have on manufacturers. Even assuming expanded liability
invites riskier behavior on the part of consumers, it also encourages safer
behavior on the part of manufacturers. Strict liability is liability without
fault, but expanding liability will still change behavior, because
239
manufacturers will include liability as a cost of doing business. This
encourages manufacturers to market their products responsibly and to
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Henderson & Twerski, supra note 219, at 1268.
63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 519 (2010).
Henderson, supra note 201, at 393.
Id.
Id.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 531.
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sell their products to safe users. Whether savings due to the decline in
injuries because of manufacturer safety precautions would offset any
increase in consumer risk based on a moral hazard is an empirical
question. However the possibility of consumer moral hazard alone
should not dissuade experimentation in strict products liability regimes.
Expanding liability to products without defects does not pose a
significant moral hazard, because liability is limited to foreseeable use of
a product and an affirmative defense of consumer negligence discourages
misuse of a product. Additionally, any increase in injuries resulting from
risky behavior on the part of consumers must be balanced against riskaverse behavior on the part of manufacturers.

Conclusion
More than ten years after the publication of the Restatement
(Third), controversy persists over the appropriate standard of design
defects. Nowhere is the controversy more unsettled than in Pennsylvania,
where a recent decision by the Third Circuit produced a split between
state and federal courts applying Pennsylvania law. Currently, in
products liability cases, federal courts apply the Restatement (Third),
while Pennsylvania state courts continue to apply the Restatement
(Second). The division in Pennsylvania is characteristic of the rest of the
country, in which different states apply drastically different standards to
define product defect.
This division presents an opportunity to clarify the law, not only in
Pennsylvania, but also throughout the country. Rather than follow either
the Restatement (Second) or the Restatement (Third), which have led to
the current division, courts and legislatures should apply a form of strict
liability that holds manufacturers of products liable when the foreseeable
use of the product causes an injury. Plaintiffs should only have to
produce evidence of a reasonable alternative design after the defendant
has proven negligent use or assumption of risk. By eliminating the
elusive concept of defect from a products liability regime, liability will be
more predictable and will better reflect the true costs of product use.
Courts have struggled to develop a standard that realizes the
purpose of strict products liability, without overburdening manufacturers
or underprotecting consumers. Neither the Restatement (Second), nor
the Restatement (Third) was successful in defining design defects. If the
term “defect” lacks a coherent definition, it should not trigger liability.
This Note proposes removing defect as a requirement for liability.
Ultimately, this Note seeks to further the discussion towards developing
a just and unified standard of products liability law.

240. Id.
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